




















Special Report 2 
 
 
Malaysia's  2013 Election:  The 
Nation and the National Front 1  
(By Amrita Malhi) 
 
Winning an election may still be one of life’s 
great thrills, but the afterglow is diminishing. 
(Naim 2013: 1713) 
 
 If ever an election victory could be 
interpreted as a humiliation by the winning side, 
then the Malaysian federal election, held in May 
this year, was profoundly humiliating for the 
National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN).  
 
 BN won government for the thirteenth 
time, and extended its uninterrupted hold on 
federal government in Malaysia. It also 
continues to hold a majority of states in the 
federation. In this sense, BN’s political 
primacy—as the sole government Malaysia has 
ever known—remains in place, in the nation it 
argues its predecessors brought in to being in 
1957 (Cheah Boon Kheng 2002; Hooker 2003). 
 
 Aside from remaining in government, 
however, BN has nevertheless had to reconcile 
itself to a new political environment, in which 
its domination of the architecture of ‘the 
national’ is no longer guaranteed. The polls and 
technics that group together within this new 































































1 This article is part of a longer journal article 
in progress, currently entitled ‘Malaysian New 
Media Campaigning: Cleaving the Nation from 
its National Front’. Please direct any comments 
or feedback to amrita.malhi@unisa.edu.au. 
 
commentary since May.2  Yet one feature of this 
recent election that remains undiscussed is the 
extent to which it reveals that BN’s hold over 
narratives of the nation’s past, present and 
future has weakened considerably over the past 
decade. Indeed, the May election has revealed 
that BN is no longer assured that it can 
smoothly weave narratives of its own history 
together with those of the nation’s development 
(Hooker 2003:Chp 1).  
 
 This effect has exposed a heightened 
level of contestation about how the nation itself 
should be understood—indeed, how it should be 
constituted—and this contestation is played out 
in several key national spaces in which political 
debate is conducted. These spaces include the 
federal parliament, in which BN relies on an 
electoral gerrymander to retain sufficient seats 
to form government; and the public sphere, 
which is characterised by the rise of the digital 
media and the erosion of older print and 
broadcast mediascapes (Surin 2010; Yeoh Seng 
Guan 2010). As a result, absolute parliamentary 
numbers aside, both spaces are increasingly 
fragmented, and are no longer BN’s exclusive 
domain. 
 
 The result is a new narrative instability 
in the public sphere, as control over the nation’s 
foundational discourses has palpably slipped 
away from BN. For example, it is no longer the 
sole custodian of the text of the national 
constitution, nor can it alone elaborate a 
doctrine of multi-ethnic unity in the service of 
development. This is because the capacity for 
intervention in these two narrative fields is 































































2 For example, refer to New Mandala: 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/cate






















important enablers—which BN once appeared 
likely to control with impunity for the indefinite 
future. The first two of these enablers were first 
lost to BN in 2008, and the 2013 election 
confirmed these losses. They consist of the 
federal parliamentary supermajority, and 
control of every state parliament except for 
Kelantan. This year, in addition to these two 
facets of its power, BN also lost the national 
popular vote, shaking its narrative foundations 
even further still. 
 
 In this new political situation, BN is 
unable—for now—to make the very claim that 
has always been central to its very political 
rationale. This is the claim embodied in its 
name: namely that BN alone can unite a multi-
ethnic plural society, protecting each group 
from the others’ divergent interests, and acting 
as the sole legitimate channel through which 
national aspirations should be funneled (Mauzy 
1983). Indeed, the 2013 election result does not 
only illustrate the extent to which the nation 
identifies with the National Front which leads it; 
rather it also brings in to question the extent to 
which the National Front is able to identify 
itself with the nation it leads. 
 
 Barisan Nasional can no longer project 
its exclusive authority over the national 
narrative in the public sphere. This is because 
the erosion of its electoral domination carries 
profound implications for how BN, the ‘national’ 
front, projects its affinity with, and its authority 
over, the polity and the public known as ‘the 
nation’. The crux of these implications is that 
BN can no longer smoothly conflate its identity 
and interests with those of the nation; whereas 
the capacity to do so has been essential to its 
exercise of power for more than fifty years.  
 
 Granted, ‘power’ is impossible to 
quantify as an accumulation of elemental 
components. Yet in the contest of narratives 
embedded in Malaysian politics, BN’s capacity 
to claim that only it can represent the nation 
has been a critical feature of its modality for 
wielding it. This is particularly the case if 
‘power’ is understood very simply as ‘an arbiter 
of a menu of actions’ available to a national 
executive (Naim 2013: 619). As such, this 
erosion of power also underpins and enables an 
argument prosecuted since May by the People’s 
Alliance coalition (Pakatan Rakyat, or PR) that 
it, and not BN, now represents ‘the nation’. 
Now that it commands the national popular 
vote in addition to strong multi-ethnic 
credentials of its own—in addition to three 
state governments and the new media public 
sphere—PR, in its turn, currently possesses a 
greatly enhanced capacity for national claim-
making. In this dynamic, and at least for this 
moment, it appears that the nation and its 




 BN’s loss of access to the three enablers 
described above is of critical importance because 
of the multiple ways in which they enforce each 
other. First, it has now decisively, and possibly 
even permanently, lost its two-thirds 
majority—also known as a supermajority—of 
seats in the House of Representatives (Dewan 
Rakyat). BN originally lost this supermajority at 
the last election in 2008—the first it had 
suffered such a loss since 1969. This is therefore 
only the second period of time in the nation’s 
history during which BN has not held a 
supermajority. Indeed, this is the first time this 
has happened within the living memory of the 
nearly three-quarters of Malaysians who are 
younger than forty (Weiss 2013: 308-309). 
Further, the historic 2008 result saw BN win 






















 This year, rather than make up ground 
this year as it had hoped, BN won only 133, or 
60 per cent, of 222 seats. The 2013 result has 
therefore taken BN back even closer to its 1969 
low point, when its predecessor, the Alliance, 
won only 77, or 53 per cent, of 144 seats. 
 
 In part, the significance of this 
supermajority has been found in the way in 
which it operates as a form of psychological set 
point; a base performance trend line beneath 
which confidence plummets in an increasingly 
competitive political marketplace. Without it, 
BN’s capacity to command parliamentary 
authority—even while still in government—is 
diminished from its previous peak, rendering it 
psychologically enervated and defensive as a 
result. The supermajority is also significant 
because of the relationship it has underpinned 
between BN and the nation’s constitution. 
Without an automatic assurance of two-thirds 
of the parliamentary vote, BN has also thereby 
lost its capacity to unilaterally amend the 
constitution.3 
 
 The loss of the supermajority, then, 
represents a loss to BN of the institutional 
capacity it once possessed to ‘[privatise] the 
rules and procedures used by a nation-state to 
keep control over the activities within its 
territory’ (Castells 2008: 81). This loss only 
underscores BN’s humiliation again: the 
constitution is the nation’s founding document, 
statement of fundamental principles, and an 































































3 Article 159 of the Constitution allows for its 
revision if amendments are supported by ‘the 
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members’ in either House of 
Parliament. For more details, refer to (2010). 
Federal Constitution: Reprint. Kuala Lumpur, The 
Commissioner of Law Revision Malaysia. 
up by BN’s predecessors, alongside British 
administrators and members of Malaysia’s 
various royal families (Cheah Boon Kheng 2002; 
Hooker 2003; Sham Saleem Faruqi 2008). 
Parliamentary supermajority, the constitution, 
and BN have therefore existed in symbiosis 
until very recently, and BN has held unchecked 
power over both institutions as a result. Indeed, 
according to one recent estimate, BN has 
invoked its supermajority to author more than 
700 amendments to the constitution over the 
years since independence (Adilah R.A. Nasir 
2013). Now that it can no longer make such 
amendments on its own, it can no longer adjust 
the nation’s textual foundations to reconfigure 
how the polity operates, whenever it judges this 
option expedient. This is a significant blow to 
BN’s narrative-making power. 
 
 BN’s second important loss is that it 
can no longer claim to function as a force that 
unites discrete ethnic groups, each possessing 
distinct, and divergent, interests. This is 
because, in federal parliamentary terms, BN is 
now barely a multi-ethnic coalition of parties at 
all. Of its three component parties, the 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) are now 
barely represented in the federal parliament at 
all, having won only seven and four seats 
respectively. As a result, the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) now dominates 
BN, holding 88 of its 133 seats (Suruhanjaya 
Pilihan Raya Malaysia 2011). BN is also now 
closely identified with the Malay supremacist 
organisation, Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa 
Malaysia (Perkasa), whose membership largely 
overlaps with that of UMNO (Chin 2012: 272). 
Perkasa serves a dual purpose for UMNO. It is 
both an external body to which UMNO can 
outsource its more provocative ethnic wedge 
campaigns (Malhi 2010); and a pressure group 





















which asserts a chauvinistic pressure on 
UMNO leaders when they make their political 
calculations (Welsh 2013). 
 
 Second, in addition to this result in the 
federal parliament, BN no longer commands 
institutional capacity in relation to the 
resources and machineries associated with the 
state governments of largely-urban Selangor 
and Penang. Its loss of these diverse economic 
and demographic hubs has also dented its 
capacity to claim that it alone embodies and 
represents the multi-racial national public. As a 
result, BN can no longer claim that it alone can 
bring this public together to overcome 
imminent racial strife, guiding it instead toward 
a common good: economic development. 
Further, now that it can no longer make this 
claim, it can also no longer write off largely-
rural, agrarian and Malay Muslim-dominated 
Kelantan—the only state it has failed to hold 
for nearly the entire period since 
independence—as an anomaly (Roff 1974; 
Kessler 1978). Under the leadership of former 
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad (1981-
2003), for example, BN used to frequently make 
both these claims to characterise support for 
political alternatives as evidence of religious 
fanaticism and anti-development stupidity 
(Malhi 2003). 
 
 Third, a new loss of institutional 
capacity, freshly inflicted by voters in May this 
year, has also further eroded BN’s power over 
the narrative it has constructed of the nation’s 
foundation and subsequent development. This 
was the critically important loss of the popular 
vote, for the first time ever since the nation 
came in to being. Despite winning government 
by winning a majority of parliamentary seats, 
BN won only 47 per cent of votes cast. Even in 
1969, the first election in which BN (in its 
previous avatar, the Alliance) lost its 
supermajority, the only government the nation 
has ever known was still returned with 51 per 
cent of the popular vote (Nohlen, Grotz et al. 
2001). This new development also affects BN’s 
capacity to project its narrative in the public 
sphere. For one, this is because it entirely 
exposes the importance of the rural 
gerrymander in ensuring BN wins sufficient 
seats in parliament, even while its vote has 
fallen so far in percentage terms. Granted, BN 
maintains a distinct advantage in rural seats in 
which demographic and political tendencies 
favour the operations of its campaign machinery, 
namely certain of those known to largely 
consist of Malay Muslim voters (Aspinall 2013). 
Nevertheless, as one recent analysis 
demonstrates, the gap in population size 
between the largest and the smallest electoral 
constituencies in Malaysia has grown steadily 
since 1972, and as a result, the number of seats 
dominated by Malay Muslim voter populations 
now comprises 75.2 per cent of the total seats 
(Lee Hock Guan 2013: 8). 
 
 BN’s loss of the popular majority vote 
also holds a deep narrative significance because 
the 2013 result was not followed by ethnic 
violence, as the 1969 election result was, 
although that result was characterised by a loss 
to BN of the supermajority alone, and not the 
popular vote as well. Nor did the 2008 result 
lead to violence, when the supermajority was 
first lost for this, the second time. That violence 
did not occur does not concord with the BN-
propagated narrative of national and inter-
ethnic instability being the most likely result of 
voters rejecting their permanent domination of 
the federal parliament. Indeed, it is for this 
reason that the question of violence, similar to 
that which occurred in 1969, has been posed by 
media commentators at every election since 





















coalition, in successive iterations, since 1999.4 
Most Malaysians today, however, do not 
remember 1969, and it seems that recent 
election results have done little to remind them 
of it. This was despite Kuala Lumpur being on 
high alert on the night of 5 May—election 
night; with police check points established on 
the deserted freeways leading in and out of 
Kuala Lumpur, and a ban imposed on politically 




 The new media has emerged as a 
relatively free and open aspect of a global public 
sphere in which Malaysians—regardless of 
where they might live—participate to produce 
and shape alternative narratives of the nation 
and its trajectory (Castells 2008). Due to BN’s 
lack of institutional capacity for maintaining 
national structures of control around the new 
public sphere, its capacity for national claim-
making is weakened. As a result, a genuine 
recovery of alternative narratives appears to be 
gathering pace, and these narratives are 
increasingly recovered as forms of national 
memory inscribed within digital networks, in 
addition to functioning as campaign narratives 
for Pakatan Rakyat. This recovery is afforded 
not only by the relative freedom of the new 































































4 Refer, for one example from the many surely 
which abound, to an interview I gave to Radio 




5 From personal observation of driving on the 
Federal Highway and the New Pantai 
Expressway, in and out of the Lembah Pantai 
electorate, centred on Bangsar on Kuala 
Lumpur’s southwest boundary. 
of experience, and indeed professionalisation, 
commanded by certain sections of its 
participants. It is therefore in the new media 
public sphere that BN has most obviously 
suffered a major blow to its capacity to conflate 
its identity and interests with those of the 
nation, especially since losing its exclusive 
access to the other political enablers discussed 
above.  
 
 These alternative national claims are 
the subject of the full-length article that 
expands on this half-length contribution to 
Berita. Some of these claims operate as advances 
on the institutional capacity inherent in the 
legacy of the original constitution (Khoo 2013). 
Others constitute assertions that PR ‘won the 
election’, only to be blocked by the electoral 
gerrymander and the Election Commission.6 
Others function to withdraw from BN the 
multi-ethnic currency which comes with 
holding the nation’s diverse population centres, 
accusing BN of anachronism and racism instead 
(Malhi 2013). Additional claims serve to 
differentiate the ‘national’ public—that of 
Malaysian citizen-voters—from the extra-
national ‘constitutive outside’ populated by 
foreign workers. These workers included the 
‘planeloads’, or ‘40,000’ Bangladeshis alluded to 
in the ‘get out the vote’ campaign run by PR, 
the Sarawak Report and campaign pressure 
group, Anyone But UMNO, along with the 
electoral reform NGO, Bersih. 
 
 Ultimately, these new national claims 































































6 For example, refer to recent comments to this 
effect by Pakatan Rakyat’s Dato’ Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim at the Adelaide Festival of Ideas in 























the pro-PR activist public to recover, 
memorialise and celebrate alternative 
possibilities extant in the period of the national 
liberation struggle, when alternative 
trajectories for Malaya and Malaysia appeared 
possible. This urge was evident in the social 
media circulation in September of images of 
young activists displaying the Sang Saka 
Malaya flag—a red and white standard 
popularised by the 1940s Left, illegalised by the 
Emergency Declaration of 1948. The flag is 
controversial because it invokes a historical 
vision of Malaysia as a republic, and appears to 
blend the national flags of Singapore and 
Indonesia.7  This urge was again evident in the 
social media circulation of images, videos and 
debating points after the funeral of Chin Peng, 
leader of the Malayan Communist Party, in 
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8 For example, refer to video interviews 
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